The Dog that Finally Barked:England as an Emerging Political Community by Wyn Jones, Richard et al.
Institute for Public Policy Research
Richard Wyn Jones, Guy Lodge, 
Ailsa Henderson, Daniel Wincott
January 2012 
© IPPR 2012
report
The dog ThaT  
finally barked
England as an EmERgIng PolItIcal communIty
About the Authors
richard Wyn Jones is professor of politics and director of the Wales governance centre at cardiff university. 
Richard has written extensively on devolved politics in the uK, contemporary Welsh politics and nationalism.
Guy Lodge is associate director for politics and power at IPPR. He is also the author (with anthony 
seldon) of Brown at 10.
Daniel Wincott is Blackwell professor of law and society and co-chair of the Wales governance 
centre at cardiff university. His latest book – The Political Economy of European Welfare 
Capitalism (co-written with colin Hay) – will be published in 2012.
Ailsa Henderson is senior lecturer and marie curie international incoming fellow in the 
department of politics and international relations at the university of Edinburgh.
Acknowledgments
the survey on which this report is based was a joint initiative by cardiff university, 
the university of Edinburgh and IPPR, the latter with the support of the Joseph 
Rowntree charitable trust. In addition to thanking the various institutions involved, 
the authors would also like to thank laurence Janta-lipinski at yougov, glenn 
gottfried at IPPR, gareth young, John curtice and mike Kenny for their support 
and advice. all errors remain our own.
this paper is published as part of IPPR’s English Question research 
programme, kindly supported by the Joseph Rowntree charitable trust. 
For more information, visit http://www.ippr.org/research-project/44/7115/
english-questions
Previous publications from the IPPR-JRct programme include: 
Is there an English nationalism? (2011) by Richard English; The 
English Question: The View from Westminster (2010) by michael 
Kenny and guy lodge; English Questions in a Devolved United 
Kingdom (2010) by michael Kenny, guy lodge and Katie 
schmuecker; Is an English Backlash emerging? Reactions to 
Devolution Ten Years On (2010) by John curtice; and More 
than One English Question (2009) by michael Kenny and 
guy lodge. all are available at www.ippr.org
About IPPr
IPPR, the Institute for Public Policy Research, is the 
uK’s leading progressive thinktank. We produce 
rigorous research and innovative policy ideas for a fair, 
democratic and sustainable world.
We are open and independent in how we work, and 
with offices in london and the north of England, IPPR 
spans a full range of local and national policy debates. 
our international partnerships extend IPPR’s influence 
and reputation across the world.
IPPR 
4th Floor 
14 Buckingham street 
london Wc2n 6dF 
t: +44 (0)20 7470 6100 
E: info@ippr.org 
www.ippr.org  
Registered charity no. 800065
this paper was first published in January 2012. © 2012 
the contents and opinions expressed in this paper are 
those of the author(s) only.
ideaS to 
Change briTain
In collaBoRatIon WItH
IPPR  |  The dog that finally barked: England as an emerging political community1
Executive summary ......................................................................................................2
Introduction: the English enigma .................................................................................4
1. The Future of England Survey ..................................................................................7
2. Devolution: the view from England ..........................................................................9
3. England emerges ....................................................................................................13
4. England as a nascent political community ............................................................18
5. The political consequences of English identity......................................................26
6. Conclusion: England and the problem of British politics .......................................31
	 	 CONTENTS
IPPR  |  The dog that finally barked: England as an emerging political community2
This report presents the findings of the Future of England (FoE) Survey which has 
been developed in partnership between Cardiff University’s Wales Governance Centre, 
Edinburgh University’s Institute for Governance and IPPR. The FoE represents one of the 
most comprehensive examinations of English attitudes to questions of identity, nationhood 
and governance to date – and the only major survey in this area conducted in England 
since both the formation of a coalition government at Westminster and the election of a 
majority SNP administration in Holyrood.
It has long been predicted that devolution to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland would 
provoke an English ‘backlash’ against the anomalies and apparent territorial inequities 
of a devolved UK state. To the surprise of some, evidence of such a development was 
limited in the initial years of devolution. However, there are now signs that a stirring 
within England is beginning to take shape. The evidence presented here suggests the 
emergence of what might be called an ‘English political community’, one marked by 
notable concerns within England about the seeming privileges of Scotland, in particular, 
in a devolved UK, a growing questioning of the capacity of the current UK-level political 
institutions to pursue and defend English interests, and one underpinned by a deepening 
sense of English identity.
In respect of English attitudes to devolution and the union, the report finds that:
• The number of voters in England who believe that Scottish devolution has made the 
way Britain is governed worse (35 per cent) has doubled since 2007.
• The English increasingly believe they get a raw-deal from the devolved settlement, 
with 45 per cent of voters in England saying that Scotland gets ‘more than its fair 
share of public spending’ – the number agreeing with this has almost doubled since 
2000. Meanwhile 40 per cent of voters in England say that England gets ‘less than its 
fair share’ of public money.
• 52 per cent of English respondents believe that Scotland’s economy benefits more 
than England’s from being in the UK, while less than one in four believe England and 
Scotland’s economies benefit equally.
• While support for Scottish independence remains low – only 22 per cent say Scots 
should go it alone – the English strongly support the view that the current devolved 
settlement should be reformed. At fully 80 per cent, there is also overwhelming. 
support in England for ‘devolution-max’ (full fiscal autonomy) for Scotland, with 44 per 
cent agreeing strongly. 79 per cent say Scottish MPs should be barred from voting on 
English laws, with an absolute majority agreeing strongly with that proposition.
• There has been a sharp rise since 2007 in the proportion of English voters who 
say they agree strongly with barring Scottish MPs from voting on English laws and 
‘devolution-max’, which underlines the intensity of feeling now associated with these 
reforms.
In respect of English views on how they themselves are governed, the report finds that: 
• Having initially been content to continue to be governed themselves by an unreformed 
set of UK institutions at Westminster, support for the status quo has now fallen to just 
one in four of the English electorate. 59 per cent say that they do not trust the UK 
government to work in the best long-term interests of England.  
• English voters appear to want what we call an ‘English dimension’ to the country’s 
politics – that is, distinct governance arrangements for England as a whole. 
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• At present, though, views as to what form this English dimension should take have yet 
to crystallise around a single alternative, with support divided between some form of 
‘English votes on English laws’ and an English parliament.
In respect of trends in national identity, the report finds that: 
• These changing views about how England should be governed are also being 
underpinned by changes in patterns of national identity in England. While a majority 
retain a dual sense of English and British identity, there is evidence to suggest that we 
are witnessing the emergence in recent decades of a different kind of Anglo-British 
identity, in which the English component is increasingly considered the primary source 
of attachment for the English. 
• The proportion of the population that prioritise their English over their British identity 
(40 per cent) is now twice as large as that which prioritise their British over their 
English identity (16 per cent). 60 per cent of English respondents believe that the 
English have become more aware of Englishness in recent years. 
• English identity appears to be stronger than British identity – or the English 
component of dual English-British identity stronger than the British component 
– across England’s diverse regions (including London) and across all social and 
demographic groups, with one exception: members of ethnic minorities, who place 
much greater emphasis on their British identity. The report, however, also points 
to tentative evidence of a growth in English identification within ethnic minority 
communities in recent years, albeit from a lower base. 
• There is strong evidence that English identity is becoming politicised: that is, the more 
strongly English a person feels the more likely they are to believe that the current 
structure of the post-devolution UK is unfair and the more likely they are to support 
the development of an English dimension to the governance of England. The report 
argues that this finding is important precisely because the group that choose to 
emphasise their English over their British identity – and who feel most strongly about 
the case for reform – are an increasingly important constituency in English political life. 
Finally the report highlights not only the failure of the mainstream political parties to take 
the English question seriously, but also the electorate’s belief that none of the parties 
stand up for English interests:
• More people believe that none of the parties stand up for the interests of England (23 
per cent) than believe that either of the main political parties do.
The report concludes by arguing that ignoring the developments it highlights – growing 
popular dissatisfaction with the territorial status quo and support for an English dimension 
to the institutions of government – will not make them disappear. Especially given that they 
are buttressed not only by the workings of a system of asymmetric devolution that ensures 
that a de facto English polity is emerging ever more clearly into view, but also by changes 
in patterns of national identity. The latter are sure to be particularly consequential. Despite 
the exhortations of successive governments that have focused exclusively on Britishness, 
at the popular level it is Englishness that resonates most. These developments matter. In 
the view of the authors, the main problem is not that the English question is now finally 
being asked by the country’s electorate, but rather that the British political class has failed 
to take it, and them, seriously.
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Inspector Gregory (Scotland Yard detective): ‘Is there any other point to 
which you would wish to draw my attention?’
Holmes: ‘To the curious incident of the dog in the night-time.’
Inspector Gregory: ‘The dog did nothing in the night-time.’
Holmes: ‘That was the curious incident.’
Arthur Conan Doyle, Silver Blaze (1892)
Devolution has transformed the government of the UK. Since the establishment of the 
Scottish Parliament in 1999, Scotland has been governed by its own powerful parliament 
and government. While the Welsh National Assembly established in the same year 
was initially much weaker, following the March 2011 referendum, Wales also has its 
own legislature with extensive powers as well as its own Welsh government. After the 
interregnum of ‘direct rule’, Northern Ireland has also returned to a system of devolved 
government as part of the wider peace process. The result is that, across many of the 
most important areas of public policy, including health and education, the UK government 
is now, to all intents and purposes, the English government. In these same policy areas 
Westminster is a parliament whose effective writ runs only in England. As an unintended 
consequence of devolution, therefore, an English polity has (re)emerged as an incubus at 
the heart of the UK state. Yet, there have been few signs so far that these major shifts in 
the governance of the UK have been accompanied by an increased awareness of England 
as a political community in its own right.
During the years since 1999 – and, indeed, at various points during the preceding 
decades when devolution was on the political agenda – more or less dire warnings 
have been issued about the likely impact of all this on opinion in England. The people 
of England, it was claimed, would become increasingly resentful of the anomalies that 
inevitably arise in the context of a system of asymmetric devolution. The most striking 
of these is crystallised by the now famous and obviously rhetorical ‘West Lothian 
Question’: how can it be right that an MP representing West Lothian (or, for that matter, 
Carmarthen West or West Tyrone) can have a voice in determining, say, education policy 
in England, when, as a result of devolution, English MPs cannot influence education 
policy in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland? In addition, it was suggested that English 
taxpayers would become increasingly aware and resentful of the fact that per capita 
levels of public spending are higher in the devolved territories than in England itself. 
Finally, it was also suggested that the English would respond to what were claimed to 
be increasingly assertive expressions of Scottish and Welsh national identity by turning 
their backs on Britishness and embracing an avowedly English identity – an identity 
which many seem to assume is somehow inherently more xenophobic and less inclusive 
(particularly of ethnic minorities) that British or indeed Scottish and Welsh identities. 
In the early years of devolution, however, these fears appeared overstated: the available 
evidence suggested that the English remained blithely indifferent to it all. Curiously, 
for some at least, the English dog did not bark in the night. While generally supportive 
of devolution for Scotland and Wales, English voters remained firmly attached to the 
Westminster system of government themselves (as Labour was to discover during its 
abortive attempts to create regional assemblies in England.) As for difference in levels 
of public expenditure: the English may well have been mildly peeved but they certainly 
did not seem unduly perturbed. Moreover, even if badges of English identity such as the 
St George’s Cross had undoubtedly become more prevalent, the majority of the English 
population seemed to retain a general, undifferentiated sense of Englishness/Britishness 
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(the conflation of which had long been a running sore in Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland.) Certainly there was little sign that a strengthening of English self-awareness 
demanded or required expression through distinct English political institutions. If, as 
Jeremy Paxman once claimed, ‘the English have not spent a great deal of time defining 
themselves because they haven’t needed to’, then it appeared as if devolution had done 
little to change the situation.1
But if that was the story in the early years of devolution, there are good reasons to believe 
that this might slowly be beginning to change. For several years a recurrent theme in parts 
of the London press has been the alleged unfairness, not only of differences in relative 
levels of public spending across the UK, but also of the different bundles of free-at-the-
point-of-delivery public services now available to citizens in different parts of the post-
devolution UK. Survey and opinion poll evidence suggest that this has been matched by 
increasing resentment in England about public spending levels in Scotland, in particular.
Developments at the political level have also served to bring attitudes in England 
into sharper focus. Most obviously the re-election of a Scottish National Party (SNP) 
government in Scotland that believes it has a sufficient mandate to ensure that a 
referendum will be held on the possibility of either ‘devolution-max’ or full-blown 
independence raises the question of how English voters view these potentially 
monumental changes to the very nature of the UK state. Less dramatically, but also of 
potential consequence, is the current UK Coalition government’s decision to establish 
a commission ‘to consider’ the West Lothian question. While the length of time that it 
has taken to redeem this pledge suggests a certain reluctance to grasp the nettle, its 
very existence suggests a growing awareness that the anomalies created by asymmetric 
devolution cannot be ignored in perpetuity. 
Finally, at the popular level, symbols of English national identity continue to proliferate, 
driven partly in response to devolution but also, in part, independent of it. Various polls 
and surveys provide tentative evidence that this is matched by an increasing tendency 
among the people of England to identify themselves primarily as English (while also as 
British).
This is clearly, therefore, an opportune time for a comprehensive look at attitudes in 
England towards:
• the way that the UK has developed politically post-devolution
• how England is and ought to be governed, and
• national identity – specifically the extent to which a resurgent sense of Englishness 
is being experienced uniformly across England’s regionally and socially diverse 
population and whether there are signs that a stirring of English self-consciousness is 
beginning to seek some form of political expression.
As mention of regions implies, it is not enough to treat England as one undifferentiated 
whole. An apparently commonplace belief is that, despite its very long history of 
centralised government, England remains a particularly diverse nation. Moreover, even 
if the differences between English regions may prove to be overstated, the position of 
London – now a highly cosmopolitan, world city – does raise obvious questions about 
the coherence of England as a political community. So, as well as surveying attitudes 
across England as a whole, it is important to be able to ‘drill down’ into some, at least, of 
England’s regions – including those in which we have prima facie expectations of strong 
regional identity and, perhaps, differentiation – in order to discover patterns of difference 
and commonality across the country. 
In addition, as well as comparing attitudes within England, it is equally important to be 
able to locate England in a wider, comparative context: How do attitudes in England 
compare to attitudes across other nations and regions in western Europe?
In order to explore these issues, a research team comprised of researchers from Cardiff 
University’s Wales Governance Centre, Edinburgh University’s Institute of Governance and 
1 Paxman J (1998) The English: A Portrait of a People, London: Michael Joseph
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IPPR have cooperated on a unique Future of England (FoE) Survey. As well as harnessing 
the previous experience of the three collaborating institutions in undertaking survey and 
attitudes research in Wales, Scotland and England respectively, the research has also 
benefited from the key roles played by the Scottish and Welsh teams in the collaborative, 
pan-European research project that culminated in the fielding of the Citizenship after the 
Nation State (CANS) Survey in 14 European regions/nations in 2009.2 
This report summarises the findings of the FoE survey. Having first provided a brief 
overview of the survey itself, the next section of the report, Devolution: The view from 
England, focuses on current attitudes in England towards the systems of devolved 
government that have developed in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. In the 
subsequent section, England emerges, we report on changing attitudes in England 
towards the future government of England itself, and in particular, the increasing support 
for an ‘English dimension’ to the country’s politics. This is followed by an extended 
exploration of the coherence of England as a nascent political community, focusing on 
patterns of national identity within England, and in particular, the extent to which it can be 
said that there is a common sense of Englishness across the country’s different regions 
and social groups sufficient to underpin such an ‘English dimension’. Following from this 
we then turn to review The political consequences of English identity, focusing on the 
relationship between identity and constitutional preferences for the future of England. The 
report’s concluding section turns to England and the problem of British politics, namely 
the striking gap between what an increasingly large segment of the English population 
appear to want and what the political parties are currently prepared to offer them.
2 For further information about the CANS research see http://www.institute-of-governance.org/major_projects/
citizen_after_the_nation_state 
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The FoE survey represents one of the most comprehensive examinations of English 
attitudes to questions of identity, nationhood and governance to date – and the only 
major survey in this area conducted in England since both the formation of a coalition 
government at Westminster and the election of a majority SNP administration in 
Holyrood. It was undertaken on behalf of the research team by YouGov. Fieldwork was 
undertaken between 27 July and 2 August 2011. The total all-England sample size was 
1,507 adults and the resulting figures have been weighted and are representative of the 
adult population of England. The survey was conducted using an online interview of 
administered members of the YouGov GB panel of 185,000-plus individuals who have 
agreed to take part in surveys. YouGov uses its own proprietary system for sampling, 
designed by YouGov to ensure respondents are always able to take a survey. YouGov 
uses targeted quota sampling as opposed to random probability sampling. Using 
advanced analytical techniques and taking into account several key factors, YouGov’s 
samples are most frequently assigned to achieve representative samples at the end of 
fieldwork. The software looks at all surveys that currently need panel members, and 
calculates how many people to send invites to every 30 minutes. Due to the way individual 
surveys are sampled, there is no per-survey response rate; however, the overall response 
rate for the panel is 21 per cent, with the average response time for a clicked email being 
19 hours from the point of sending. 
In addition to providing an all-England sample of 1,507 respondents, the survey included 
three regional booster samples in each of:
• the North
• the Midlands 
• London
Each of these samples is separately weighted and are representative of the adult 
population in each region and details of the delineation of these regions and the sample 
size achieved are set out in table 1.1.
Region Delineation Sample size
The North North West, North East and Yorkshire and the Humber 
government standard regions combined
750
The Midlands West and East Midlands government standard regions 
combined
756
London London government standard region 750
The rationale for this choice of regions was that the research team had strong prima facie 
expectations of a clear contrast between a relatively strong and coherent regional identity 
in the North and a weaker or more nebulous sense of regional identity in the Midlands. 
The rationale for including a London sample was to allow for exploration of any differences 
between the capital and the rest of England arising from London’s status as a global city. 
By allowing the team to compare across the three regions, as well as comparing the three 
regions with the remainder of England, and indeed England as whole, the survey was 
designed to draw out patterns of commonality and difference in terms of both attitudes 
and identities.
The FoE survey consisted of 47 questions. Where possible and relevant those questions 
were drawn from other surveys to allow for comparison both across time and across 
	 1.	 THE	FUTURE	OF	ENGLAND	SURVEY
Table 1.1 
The Future of England 
Survey regions
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territories. Some of those questions featured in various iterations of the British Social 
Attitudes (BSA) Survey.3 This provides an invaluable longitudinal perspective, allowing 
the team to track shifts over time. But in addition, the research team drew on questions 
fielded in the 2009 CANS survey, allowing our English data to be read against data from 
14 regions/nations in five states (see table 1.2). Particularly noteworthy in this regard is 
that the CANS 14 included two other capital city regions, namely Paris (Île de France) and 
Vienna. Analysis of the CANS data has suggested the existence of a ‘capital city effect’ to 
which we shall return below.
As is inevitable in a project of this nature, a number of methodological questions had to be 
dealt with in drawing together data from different sources. A fundamental issue is that the 
data that we have relied on has been collected using a variety of different survey methods. 
While the FoE survey was conducted through an internet panel, BSA data was collected 
in face-to-face interviews, and CANS data collected via telephone interviews. There are, in 
addition, minor differences in the question wording used in the various surveys (not least 
because of the different survey methods relied upon.) 
We shall draw attention to differences in question wording as and when specific cases 
arise but, in general, our approach has been to attempt to supply as much relevant data 
as possible. Not least because public attitudes in England (qua England) remain under-
considered and under-studied. Part of our aim in undertaking this project is to encourage 
further survey work and analysis, not least because it will be important to test the findings 
presented below against future research. In pursuing this aim, we have decided that it is 
better to be comprehensive. Rather than labour the point, therefore, we shall trust our 
readers to sound the necessary methodological cautionary notes.4
State Region Sample size
Austria Salzburg 904
Upper Austria 901
Vienna 903
France Alsace 901
Brittany 900
Île de France 900
Germany Bavaria 925
Lower Saxony 909
Thuringia 950
Spain Castilla la Mancha 900
Catalonia 900
Galicia 900
UK* Scotland 914
Wales 900
* It is interesting, and perhaps salutary, to note that, despite their best efforts, financial support was not forthcoming in order 
to allow the research team to survey either an English region or, indeed, England as a whole. The Future of England Survey 
was funded from within the resources of the research team itself.
3 See http://www.natcen.ac.uk/ for more information about the British Social Attitudes Survey.
4 Note for tables: Due to rounding, the percentages in some columns do not add up to 100 per cent.
Table 1.2 
The CANS (2009) 
regions
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In this section we review attitudes in England towards devolved government in Scotland 
and Wales. As is immediately obvious from table 2.1, it is clear that there have been major 
changes over the past decade or so, with a sharp rise in the view that devolution has had 
a negative impact on how Britain is governed. Moreover, most of that change has taken 
place over the past four years. Whereas from 2000 to 2007 we find clear majority support 
for the proposition that devolution had made no difference to the government of Britain, 
by 2011 we find a plurality of our English respondents (with only relatively minor regional 
variation) reporting that devolution to both Scotland and Wales has made the way that 
Britain is governed worse.5
2000 2001 2002 2003 2007 2011
Impact of Scottish Parliament
Improved 18 15 19 12 12 18
Made no difference 54 62 54 64 55 20
Made worse 13  9 10 6 14 35
Don’t know 12 12 14 16 15 27
Impact of Welsh Assembly
Improved 15 11 n/a 8 11 17
Made no difference 57 65 n/a  66 58 24
Made worse 12 7 n/a 6 11 31
Don’t know 13 14 n/a 18 16 28
N 1,928 2,761 1,924 1,917 859 1,507
Source: 2000–2007, BSA (respondents living in England only); 2011, FoE 
Question: For each of the following, please state whether you think their creation has improved the way the UK is governed, 
made it worse, or made no difference.
To what should we attribute this rather dramatic shift in public attitudes? It seems 
reasonable to assume that part of the story reflects a growing perception within England 
that the English get a raw deal from the devolution settlement. Figure 2.1 makes clear that 
there is an increasingly strong tendency in England to believe that Scotland gets more 
than its ‘fair share’ of public spending. Indeed the number of people who believe this has 
more than doubled in the last decade.6 
5 As we strongly suspect that attitudes to devolution to Northern Ireland are heavily coloured by attitudes to 
the wider peace process, we have not included data on English perceptions towards it in this table. But, for 
the record, 25 per cent of our 2011 respondents thought that creating the Northern Ireland Assembly had 
‘improved’ the way the UK is governed, 22 per cent thought it had ‘made it worse’, 22 per cent thought it made 
‘no difference’, while 30 per cent chose the ‘don’t know’ category.
6 That our English respondents believe that Scotland benefits disproportionately from the union is further underlined 
in their responses to a question that probed perceptions of the economic benefits of being part of the UK. As can 
be seen from the following table, when asked whether the English or Scottish economy benefits most from being 
part of the UK, over half (52 per cent) point to the Scottish economy. Only one in four believe that the union benefits 
the English and Scottish economies equally. This view is consistent across England’s economically diverse regions.
 Which economy benefits more from being part of the UK, England 2011 (%)
England London Midlands North 
England 7 11 8 7
Scotland 52 47 51 48
Both equally 19 20 18 21
Don’t know 22 22 23 25
 Source: FoE 2011; Question: On the whole do you think that England’s economy benefits more from having Scotland in the UK, that 
Scotland’s economy benefits more from being part of the UK, or is it about equal?
	 2.	 DEVOLUTION:	THE	VIEW	FROM	ENGLAND
Table 2.1 
Perceived impact of 
devolution on how Britain 
is governed, England 
2000–2011 (%)
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No doubt related, table 2.2 suggests that a plurality of English respondents (40 per cent) 
believe that England gets ‘less than its fair share’ of public money. However, the fact that 
these tables also suggest that the English do not manifest the same sense of injustice with 
regards to levels of public spending in Wales as compared to Scotland and yet, as we 
have seen, still adopt an increasingly negative view of Welsh devolution, cautions against 
any overly simplistic reading of cause and effect. Changing attitudes in England to the 
UK’s devolved institutions cannot simply be explained away on the basis of resentment 
about relative levels of public spending.
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… more than its fair share … pretty much its fair share
… less than its fair share
Source: 2000–2007, BSA (respondents living in England only); FoE 2011 
Note: To facilitate comparison, in the case of the 2000–2007 data, we have combined two different response categories – 
‘much more than its fair share’ and ‘little more than its fair share’ – into one ‘more than its fair share’ category. Similarly ‘little 
less than its fair share’ and ‘much less than its fair share’ have been combined to form the ‘less than its fair share’ category.
Wales N. Ireland England 
… more than its fair share 26 28 7
… pretty much its fair share 28 25 26
… less than its fair share 7 5 40
Don’t know 38 42 27
N 1,507 1,507 1,507
Source: FoE 2011 
Question: Would you say that, compared with other parts of the UK, […] gets pretty much its fair share of government 
spending, more than its fair share, or less than its fair share?
To what extent has the growing belief that devolution has had a negative impact on the 
government of Britain, as well as the perception that Scotland, at least, receives more 
than its fair share of public spending, been accompanied by a rejection of the principle of 
devolution tout court by English voters? Only to a much more limited extent, suggests the 
evidence marshalled in tables 2.3 and 2.4. While time series data shows that support for 
the pre-devolution status quo is at its highest level since 1997, we find four constitutional 
options for Scotland’s future – ranging from independence to no devolution – enjoying 
very similar levels of support across the English electorate (table 2.3). We detect no 
groundswell of support within England for Scottish independence. Current attitudes in 
England towards the constitutional status of both Wales and Northern Ireland are similarly 
divided (table 2.4).
Figure 2.1 
Attitudes in England 
towards Scotland’s share 
of UK public spending, 
2000– 2011 (%)
Table 2.2 
Attitudes in England 
towards Wales/Northern 
Ireland/England share 
of UK public spending, 
2011 (%)
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1997 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2007 2011
… become independent, 
separate from UK  and EU, 
or separate from the UK 
but part of the EU
14 21 19 19 19 17 19 22
… remain part of the 
UK, with its own elected 
parliament which has 
some taxation powers
38 44 44 53 41 50 36 22
… remain part of the 
UK, with its own elected 
parliament, which has no 
taxation powers
17 13 8 7 11 8 12 19
… remain part of the 
UK, without an elected 
parliament
23 14 17 11 15 13 18 22
Don’t know 8 8 11 10 14 11 15 15
N 2,536 902 1,928 2,761 1,924 1,917 859 1,507
Sources: 1997, British Election Study (English respondents only);1999–2007, BSA (English respondents only); 2011, FoE 
Question: Which of these statements come closest to your view? Scotland should …
Wales
… become independent, separate from UK and EU, or separate from the UK 
but part of the EU
17
… remain part of the UK, with its own elected parliament which has some 
taxation powers
22
… remain part of the UK, with its own elected parliament, which has no 
taxation powers
22
… remain part of the UK, without an elected parliament 24
Don’t know 16
Northern Ireland
…become independent separate from the UK 23
…become part of the Republic of Ireland with its own elected assembly 14
…become part of the Republic of Ireland without an elected assembly 5
…remain part of the UK with its own elected assembly 26
…remain part of the UK without an elected assembly 12
Don’t know 20
N 1,507
Source: FoE 2011 
Question: Which of these statements come closest to your view? Wales/Northern Ireland should …
English support for reform is, however, far less equivocal when it comes to amendments 
that directly address grievances they have with current devolution settlement. As is clear 
from figure 2.2, so-called fiscal autonomy is supported by a stunning 80 per cent of 
English voters, with fully 44 per cent agreeing strongly and 36 per cent agreeing with the 
proposition that services in Scotland should be paid for by taxes collected in that country.7 
Meanwhile ‘English votes on English laws’ (figure 2.3) – the proposal that parliamentary 
procedures at Westminster should be adjusted to ensure that only English MPs are 
allowed to vote on those matters that only affect England – is supported by 79 per cent of 
the English electorate. Indeed an absolute majority (53 per cent) of English voters ‘strongly 
agree’ with the proposition that ‘Scottish MPs should not be allowed to vote on English 
matters’. 
7 The question was not asked of either Wales or Northern Ireland.
Table 2.3 
Attitudes in England to 
how Scotland should be 
governed, 1997–2011 (%)
Table 2.4 
Attitudes in England to 
how Wales/Northern 
Ireland should be 
governed, 2011 (%)
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The substantial rise since 2007 in the number of those who ‘strongly agree’ to fiscal 
autonomy (up 16 percentage points) and blocking non-English MPs voting on English 
matters (up 28 percentage points) underlines the intensity of feeling now associated with 
these reforms. In a context in which the Scottish government is calling for fiscal autonomy 
to be offered as an option for Scottish voters in that country’s forthcoming referendum 
(through a proposal known as ‘devolution-max’), and in which the UK government has 
set up a commission on the West Lothian question, it would appear that the English 
electorate (at least) has already made up its mind.
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Sources: 2001–2007, BSA (English respondents only); FoE 2011 
Question: Now that Scotland has its own parliament, it should pay for its services out of taxes collected in Scotland. 
Notes: 
‘Strongly disagree’ not offered in 2003; ‘Neither agree nor disagree’ not offered in 2011. 
Excludes ‘Don’t know’ responses.
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Question: Now that Scotland has its own parliament, Scottish MPs should not be allowed to vote in the House of Commons 
on laws that affect only England.  
Notes:  
‘Neither agree nor disagree’ not offered in 2011. 
Excludes ‘Don’t know’ responses.
Figure 2.2 
Attitudes in England 
towards Scottish 
‘fiscal autonomy’, 
2000–2011 (%)
Figure 2.3 
Attitudes in England 
towards ‘English votes 
on English laws’, 
2000–2011 (%)
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Thus far we have focused on attitudes in England towards how other parts of the UK 
should be governed. But what of England itself? To what extent are English voters 
still content with the institutional status quo in which England is governed by the 
UK government and UK parliament at Westminster? And if no longer content, what 
institutional architecture would they prefer to see taking its place?
The first thing to note is that there appears to be a very widespread sense that the 
institutions of government tend to favour the interests of one part of England more 
than the others. But beyond that, there is also compelling evidence to suggest that a 
substantial proportion of English voters are now dubious of the ability of UK institutions to 
work in the interests of England as a whole. 
That an overwhelming majority of the English electorate believe that the UK government 
‘looks after some parts of England more than others’ (table 3.1) is hardly unexpected. 
Nor is the very widespread perception that it is the south east in general, and London in 
particular, that are the main beneficiaries in any way surprising (table 3.2). Indeed, perhaps 
the most eloquent testimony to the ubiquity of this belief is that it is shared by a very 
clear majority of Londoners themselves. In the Midlands and the North this is a nigh-on 
universally shared view, expressed by 87 per cent and 89 per cent of our respondents 
respectively.
England London Midlands North
More or less equally 17 26 16 10
Looks after some parts 
more than others
72 58 74 77
Don’t know 11 16 9 13
N 1,507 750 756 750
Source: FoE
England London Midlands North
North East 9 12 4 1
North West 8 11 4 1
Yorkshire and Humber 6 9 2 2
East Midlands 4 8 2 3
West Midlands 6 9 3 4
East of England 8 7 7 7
London 79 63 87 89
South East 62 49 65 76
South West 26 14 26 41
None of these 0 1 0 0
Don’t know 6 13 5 4
N 1,507 750 756 750
Source: FoE 2011 
Question: Which part of England is looked after best? (Tick all that apply)
	 3.	 ENGLAND	EMERGES
Table 3.1 
UK government looks 
after the interests of all 
parts of England equally/
not equally, 2011 (%)
Table 3.2 
Which parts of England 
are looked after best, 
2011 (%)
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Given the particular focus of this paper, of more interest is the relative lack of trust in 
the UK government’s willingness to ‘work in the best long-term interests of England’ 
(table 3.3). In this case regional differences are modest. In each case a clear majority 
of respondents state that they have either not very much or no trust at all in the UK 
government to work in the best interests of England.
England London Midlands North 
A great deal 4 7 4 3
A fair amount 31 32 32 25
Not very much 42 39 41 41
Not at all 17 13 18 24
Don’t know 6 9 6 7
N 1,507 750 756 750
Source: FoE 2011 
Question: How much do you trust the UK government at Westminster to work in the best long-term interests of England?
Given the general lack of trust in politicians, it might well be objected that the sentiments 
captured in table 3.3 are a manifestation of a general discontentment with politics per se, 
rather than a more specific, let alone coherent, concern with the ability of UK institutions 
to govern effectively in the interests of England. This objection loses much of its plausibility 
once we compare attitudes towards the status quo as against other constitutional options 
that have been advanced to improve English governance.
Eng. London Mids North 
England to be governed as it is now with laws 
made by all MPs in the UK parliament
24 29 25 21
England to be governed with laws made by 
English MPs in the UK parliament 
34 33 33 32
England as a whole to have its own new English 
parliament with law-making powers 
20 13 22 20
Each region of England to have its own assembly 9 9 7 10
Don’t know 14 16 12 17
N 1,507 750 756 750
Source: FoE 2011
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England governed as it 
is now, with laws made 
by the UK parliament
62 54 57 56 50 53 54 54 57 51 49
England as whole 
to have its own new 
parliament with law-
making powers
18 19 16 17 18 21 18 21 17 26 29
Each region of England 
to have its own 
assembly that runs 
services like health*
15 18 23 20 26 21 20 18 14 15 15
N 2,718 1,928 2,761 2,897 3,709 2,684 1,794 928 859 982 980
Source: BSA (respondents living in England only) 
Question: With all the changes going on in the way different parts of Great Britain are run, which of the following do you 
think would be best for England? 
* In 2004–2006, this answer option read ‘that makes decisions about the region’s economy, planning and housing’. The 
2003 survey carried both versions of this option and demonstrated that the difference of wording did not make a material 
difference to the pattern of response. The figures quoted for 2003 are those for the two versions combined. 
Excludes ‘Don’t know’ responses.
Table 3.3 
Trust in the UK 
government to work 
in the best long-term 
interests of England, 
2011 (%)
Table 3.4 
Constitutional 
preferences for 
England, 2011 (%)
Table 3.5 
Constitutional 
preferences for England, 
1999–2009 (%)
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Table 3.4 reports responses to four constitutional options for the future governance of 
England including the status quo (capturing also the relatively minor regional variations 
in attitudes.) The first thing to note is the status quo now enjoys the support of barely 
one in four respondents. This, we believe, represents a significant shift in public opinion. 
Our desire to probe responses to the full range of options that feature in current debates 
means that this question is not strictly comparable with previous BSA questions. 
Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that all past BSA surveys bar one have found majority 
support in England for the status quo, with the only exception showing very strong 
plurality support (table 3.5). Second, even if proponents of regional government in England 
have often sought to frame such a development as a means of countering the dominance 
of the south east, this is an option that enjoys only very limited public support (including 
in the north of England). In 2011 this amounted to only 9 per cent of respondents (table 
3.4). It is clear, therefore, that support for the status quo is now very much reduced and 
that regionalism is not an alternative that enjoys popular support. What is more open to 
question is how best to interpret the rest of the findings.
At first blush, the plurality support enjoyed by ‘English votes on English laws’ in the FoE 
survey 2011 (table 3.4) would suggest that this option is now in pole position as the 
alternative to the status quo. This reading is further buttressed when we recall not only 
the attitudes towards Scottish MPs, in particular, as set out in table 2.3 above, but also 
the fact that ‘English votes on English laws’ is the only one of the alternatives actively 
championed by a mainstream political party. Indeed the Conservatives have now fought 
every general election campaign since the establishment of the devolved institutions in 
Scotland and Wales on the basis of a manifesto pledge to introduce some version of 
‘English votes on English laws’ at Westminster. Nonetheless, we would suggest that the 
truly significant aspect of these findings is rather that, in combination, support for either 
‘English votes on English laws’ or a freestanding English parliament – that is, support 
for reforms that are conspicuously ‘English’ in their territorial scope – amounts to a clear 
majority (54 per cent) of the English electorate. 
Why do we choose to attribute greater significance to the emergence of majority support 
for some form of ‘English option’ for the future governance of England, rather than to the 
existence of plurality support for ‘English votes on English laws’? Because other data from 
the survey suggests that, while support for the status quo is relatively weak and that England 
is indeed emerging as a serious option at the level of popular opinion at least, opinion in 
England has yet to coalesce decisively around any particular institutional arrangement.
This is evidenced when we turn to questions designed to probe respondents’ perceptions 
of which level of government has most influence over the way England is run and their 
preferences for which level ought to have most influence. This is a question that has 
been used to great effect in Wales and Scotland as well as part of the CANS survey, 
almost invariably underlining popular support for an enhanced role for the ‘regional’ level. 
At first glance, table 3.6 does little more than confirm the deep euroscepticism of the 
English electorate with more than one in four of the view that it is the European Union that 
currently has the most influence over the way England is run. This is very much higher 
than the equivalent figure for either Wales or Scotland. Indeed CANS data underlines the 
remarkable extent to which perceptions of the level of influence wielded by the EU differs 
in England as compared to other nations’ regions across Europe (table 3.7). Beyond this 
the responses seem to provide an endorsement for the status quo, with 70 per cent of 
respondents supporting the view that the UK government should have the most influence 
over the way England is governed. But the list of options presented in table 3.6 simply 
reflects the political institutions currently in existence for England. It does not include 
any distinctly English institutional arrangements. How does the picture change if we offer 
possible alternative options?
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Has most influence Should have most influence
Local councils 4 19
UK government 60 70
EU 27 1
Other 2 3
Don’t know 7 6
N 1,507 1,507
Source: FoE 2011 
Question: Which of the following do you think currently has the most influence over the way England is governed? Which of 
the following do you think should have the most influence over the way England is run?
‘Region’
Percentage who 
think the EU has 
most influence
England 27
Brittany 9
Upper Austria 9
Galicia 9
Alsace 8
Scotland 8
Castilla La Mancha 8
Vienna 7
Salzburg 7
Wales 7
Catalonia 6
Bavaria 6
Lower Saxony 5
Île de France 5
Thuringia 4 
Source: CANS 2009, except England FoE 2011
Table 3.8 reports responses to a number of potential constitutional arrangements for the 
government of England. The first point to note is that once other possibilities are included, 
support for the status quo declines precipitously: from the 70 per cent reported in table 3.6 
to just one in four electors. It is rather the only all-England option on offer to respondents in 
this particular question, namely an English parliament, that enjoys plurality support.
Constitutional options for England
Stronger local councils 17
Elected regional assemblies throughout England 12
An English parliament 36
UK government 24
EU 0
Other 1
Don’t know 10
N 1,507
Source: FoE 2011 
Question: And what if, in the future, there were different types of institutions in England: Which of the following do you think 
should have the most influence over the way England is run?
Table 3.6 
Which layer of 
government has, and 
should have, the most 
influence over the way 
England is run, 2011? (%)
Table 3.7 
A euroscepticism 
barometer: comparative 
attitudes towards the 
influence of the EU
Table 3.8 
Which institution(s) 
should have most 
influence over the way 
England is run, 2011? (%)
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A final observation may be entered here in parenthesis with regards ‘localism’ – namely 
the suggestion that the most appropriate way in which to govern England is through some 
combination of the UK government and parliament and a reinvigorated tier of English 
local government. To the extent to which localism is championed as a response to the 
asymmetries of devolution, and specifically the West Lothian question, it is, of course, 
a non sequitur, relating as it does to the internal government of England rather than the 
relationship between the government of the four territories that form the UK. That said, 
while there may well be very good reasons for addressing excessive centralism within 
England, public support for a radical form of localism – whereby local councils would have 
the ‘most influence’ over government within England – is limited (at 17 per cent). Moreover 
the evidence presented in this section suggests that addressing the inadequacies of the 
current balance of power between central and local government should not be regarded 
as a substitute for taking the government of England qua England far more seriously than 
has hitherto been the case. At best, localism could represent only a partial answer to the 
English question.
While alternative readings of these findings are, of course, possible, we would argue that 
our survey findings strongly suggest that support in England for the status quo (in terms 
of arrangements for territorial government) is now relatively weak. Our confidence in this 
interpretation is further strengthened by the data and analysis set out in our previous 
section on Devolution: The view from England which suggests growing concern in 
England about the fairness of devolution. As for alternatives: our findings point to the 
emergence of an English dimension to the politics of England, at least at the popular 
level. That support for particular institutional options appears to be dependent, at least 
in part, on question wording suggests that the English are divided over the precise form 
that any ‘English option’ should take. It may also indicate that it is an issue that remains of 
relatively low salience. Nonetheless, the (re)emergence of England as a political unit in the 
eyes of the English electorate is clearly a development of signal importance. 
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If an English dimension to British politics is (re)emerging, not simply as an unintended 
consequence of devolution to the ‘Celtic fringe’, but rather as an outcome desired by a 
significant section of the country’s population, this raises fundamental questions about the 
coherence of England as a nascent political community. To what extent might any putative 
political institutionalisation of ‘England’ be underpinned by a shared sense of Englishness; 
shared not only territorially but also socially? How does a sense of Englishness relate to 
Britishness? Is England becoming more like Wales and Scotland in the sense that, as is 
obviously the case for both Welsh and Scottish national identity, English national identity is 
now regarded as distinct from (if still compatible with) British identity, rather than somehow 
identical or otherwise subsumed within it? 
Individual and collective senses of identity and affiliation are not easy to measure. 
Identities tend to be multi-faceted and are often ‘subconscious’ or at least unreflected. 
Nonetheless social scientists have developed a range of techniques to explore national 
identity. Here we shall report on two possible approaches that we have adopted in the 
context of England. Happily, as will become clear, both serve to confirm the same general 
picture.
One of the simplest – and arguably most simplistic – ways of probing any given individual’s 
sense of national identity is via the so-called ‘forced identity’ question. This is a two-stage 
question (figures 4.1 and 4.2). First, respondents are asked to choose which identities 
(from a range of options) apply to themselves. At this point they are free to choose as 
many or as few options as they think appropriate. Subsequently, however, respondents 
are required to choose which ‘best describes the way you think of yourself’. When we 
asked this question to a representative sample of the English electorate, at the first, 
multiple option stage (figure 4.1) we found both British (61 per cent) and, even more so, 
English (67 per cent) identity featuring strongly. When, in the second stage (figure 4.2) they 
are forced to choose one option, again more choose English (49 per cent) than British  
(42 per cent).
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Figure 4.1 
‘Forced choice’ national 
identity (stage one), 
England 1996–2011 (%)
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Question: Which, if any, of the words below best describe the way you think of yourself? Please tick as many or as few as 
apply (stage one). And if you had to choose, which one best describes the way you think of yourself? (stage two)
The real interest of these findings comes when we locate them in a longer time series. 
Turning to the first stage (where respondents may choose a number of different options), 
while it would be unwise to make too much of one set of results, it is nonetheless striking 
that 2011 is the first time that more respondents have identified themselves as English 
rather than British. 
Our interpretation of responses to the second, ‘forced’ stage can be more definitive: here 
we witness a clear trend over time with Britishness in relative decline against an increasing 
tendency to choose English identity as the one which ‘best describes’ respondents. The 
changes involved are marked: in slightly less than two decades the proportion of respondents 
identifying as British has declined by a third. Meanwhile the proportion that chooses English 
identity has grown from less than a third to only slightly less than half of the sample. 
Critics of the forced-identity question argue that it is insufficiently nuanced, and in 
particular, by forcing respondents to choose only one identity, it ignores the fact that in 
so-called plurinational contexts like the UK, many individuals have overlapping – or nested 
– senses of identity. In other words, in the real world, individuals can – and do – feel 
both English and British without any sense of contradiction, let alone existential angst. 
In this type of context, social scientists interested in issues surrounding national identity 
often deploy a question – now known almost universally as the ‘Moreno question’ after 
the Spanish political scientist, Luis Moreno – designed to explore overlapping or nested 
identities. This asks respondents to place themselves on a spectrum that includes both 
singular and nested senses of identity. In the English case, this spectrum extends from an 
exclusively English to an exclusively British identity, with intervening levels of overlap (see 
table 4.1 for the full range of options).
Table 4.1 provides a snapshot of patterns of national identity in England in 2011. There 
are a number of ways of interpreting the results. Clearly it is possible to emphasise the 
strength of dual identity, with a majority (66 per cent) viewing themselves as having some 
combination of English and British identity. Indeed a plurality of respondents said they 
are ‘equally England and British.’ For our purposes, however, the most significant and 
revealing analysis stems from contrasting the groups that say they are either exclusively 
English, or more English than British, with those that say they are exclusively British, or 
more British than English. Why so? Because this allows us to interrogate the relative 
weight people in England attach to both their English and British identity. The results 
8 It is also perhaps worth noting that the 2006 data was collected around the time of the football World Cup.
Figure 4.2 
‘Forced choice’ national 
identity (stage two), 
England 1992–2011 (%)
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are striking. Those that prioritise their English over their British identity (40 per cent), 
outnumber those that prioritise their British over their English identity (16 per cent) by 
more than two-to-one. 
England London Midlands North 
English not British 17 13 17 17
More English than British 23 19 24 20
Equally English and British 34 25 36 39
More British than English 9 12 9 8
British not English 7 14 6 6
Other 6 10 4 5
Don’t know 3 7 3 4
N 1,507 750 756 750
Source: FoE 2011 
Question: Which, if any, of the following best describes the way you think of yourself?
Viewed as part of a time series (figure 4.3), the 2011 data proves to be the most ‘English’ 
set of responses yet encountered. More generally, even if dual identity remains the 
majority position – a point that certainly should not be overlooked – the data nonetheless 
serves to confirm the findings from the ‘forced choice’ identity question that suggested a 
strengthening of English and a concomitant waning of British identity. We do not believe 
that these two sets of data suggest that British identity is necessarily in terminal decline 
or that we are witnessing a straightforward rejection of Britishness by the English. Instead, 
we believe this evidence points to the emergence in recent decades of a different kind 
of Anglo-British identity in which the ‘Anglo’ component is increasingly considered the 
primary source of attachment for the English.
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Notes: This table combines those that say they are ‘English not British’ with the ‘More English than British’ group, and those 
that say they are ‘British not English’ with the ‘More British than English’ respondents. Excludes ‘Don’t know’ responses.
But is this shift in national affiliation shared uniformly across England’s regions? As is clear 
from table 4.1, the situation in London is somewhat different from the position in the North 
and the Midlands or, indeed, England as a whole. Specifically, patterns of national identity 
in London tend more towards the British end of the English-British spectrum than is the 
case elsewhere. Differences here should not be exaggerated, however. Even in London, the 
Table 4.1 
England ‘Moreno’ 
identities, 2011 (%)
Figure 4.3 
Trends in ‘Moreno’ 
national identity, England 
1997–2011 (%)
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overall balance tilts towards the English side of the spectrum. Nonetheless, the differences 
between London and the English average are interesting and require further explanation. 
One possibility is the existence of a ‘capital city’ effect. With London home to almost every 
significant British institution, might the capital’s population be more inclined to associate 
themselves with Britishness than is the case elsewhere? Another possible explanation is 
the presence in London of a relatively large proportion of immigrants. Fully 20 per cent of 
our London sample was born outside the UK as compared to 5 per cent and 3 per cent 
for the Midlands and the North respectively. Might these immigrants have found it easier 
to adopt – or adapt to – a British rather than English identity? We shall return to that 
question below.
In addition to probing individual respondents’ own sense of national identity, we also 
asked respondents whether or not they assented with the proposition that ‘people in 
England have become more aware of their English national identity’. As is clear from table 
4.2, fully 60 per cent either agreed or agreed strongly. Regional differences in responses 
were minimal, further suggesting that this is indeed a very widely held belief.
England London Midlands North 
Agree strongly 19 17 21 19
Agree 41 42 43 41
Disagree 20 19 18 18
Disagree strongly 4 4 3 4
Don’t know 17 19 15 19
N 1,507 750 756 750
Source: FoE 2011 
Question: Recently, people in England have become more aware of English national identity.
When located in a comparative context through the data available from the 2009 CANS, what 
is striking is the relative strength of the English component of national identities in England 
as part of the broader structure of dual identities. Indeed, as table 4.3 makes clear, only in 
Scotland and Catalonia are sub-state national identities stronger than in England.9 This must 
be considered a truly remarkable finding, especially when it is recalled that, with the significant 
exception of sport, and in stark contrast to the Scottish and Catalan cases, England does not 
have the same tradition of official institutionalisation and celebration of English (as opposed 
to British) identity. Quite the opposite, in fact: the strengthening of English identity appears to 
be a phenomenon that is being driven by the English themselves, despite the entreaties of an 
official level that seems to focus almost exclusively on the benefits of Britishness.
The evidence marshalled thus far strongly suggests that English identity is in the ascendant 
even if dual or nested English and British identity remains the norm. This impression 
is further underlined when we review responses to other questions that facilitate an 
exploration of the relationship between senses of Britishness and Englishness.
Asked how proud they feel to be English and British (table 4.4) we find very high levels 
of pride in both national identities. Fully 79 and 77 per cent, respectively, of respondents 
in England report that they are very proud or fairly proud to be English and British. There 
is, nonetheless, greater emphasis on the English dimension with a 10 point gap between 
those who say they are very proud to be English and those who are very proud to be 
British. There are some interesting regional variations in responses here, with Londoners 
(at 39 per cent) least likely to say that they are ‘very proud’ to be English. However, even 
in the capital the proportion of respondents who report being very proud to be English is 
higher than the proportion who are very proud to be British.
9 By choosing to differentiate between the ‘state’ and the ‘regional’ levels, we realise that we will likely offend 
both state nationalists, who prefer to differentiate between the ‘national’ and ‘sub-national’ levels, and 
sub-state nationalists, who chafe against the use of ‘region’ in the context of territorial entities that regard 
themselves as ‘nations’. We simply ask for forbearance on the basis that it is, in our experience, impossible to 
find a terminology that is both universally understandable and politically neutral.
Table 4.2 
People in England have 
become more aware of 
English national identity, 
2011 (%)
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‘Region’ 
only
‘Region’ > 
State Equal
State > 
‘Region’ State only
Scotland 19 41 26 4 7
Catalonia 16 29 37 6 6
England 17 23 34 9 7
Wales 11 29 33 10 15
Upper Austria 10 16 38 11 22
Bavaria 9 19 36 11 19
Thuringia 9 18 44 9 17
Salzburg 9 17 50 9 10
Vienna 7 14 38 15 19
Galicia 6 25 57 6 4
Lower Saxony 6 11 34 15 27
Brittany 2 23 50 15 9
Castilla la Mancha 2 4 52 18 20
Alsace 1 17 42 20 15
Île de France 1 7 30 42 12
Source: CANS 2009, except England FoE 2011
England London Midlands North
English
Very proud 48 39 52 47
Fairly proud 31 29 30 31
Not very proud 9 9 8 12
Not at all proud 4 3 4 3
British 
Very proud 38 36 39 39
Fairly proud 39 38 41 38
Not very proud 13 10 12 15
Not at all proud 5 4 4 4
N 1,432 662 730 721
Source: FoE 2011 
Question: How proud, if at all, are you to be English/British? 
Note: excludes ‘Not applicable’ and ‘Don’t know’.
A very similar picture emerges when we probe respondents’ sense of attachment to 
various territorial scales. With regards to relative levels of attachment to England and the 
UK as a whole (table 4.5), we find that there is indeed a greater sense of attachment to 
England (85 per cent) than the UK (76 per cent), although this is in context of high levels 
of attachment to both. The difference between them is most marked in relation to the 
proportions declaring themselves to be very attached to England (44 per cent) as opposed 
to those very attached to Britain (31 per cent). There are no significant regional differences 
to this pattern.
Table 4.3 
Comparative trends in 
‘Moreno’ national 
identity (%)
Table 4.4 
National pride, 2011 (%)
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England London Midlands North
England
Very attached 44 44 45 44
Fairly attached 41 41 40 38
Not very attached 11 10 11 14
Not at all attached 3 3 4 3
Don’t know 1 2 1 2
UK 
Very attached 31 33 31 30
Fairly attached 45 43 45 46
Not very attached 17 17 17 17
Not at all attached 6 5 6 5
Don’t know 1 2 1 2
N 1,507 750 756 750
Source: FoE 2011 
Question: How attached, if at all, do you feel to the following places?
Once again the CANS data allows us to compare the sense of attachment in England 
with that observable in other European nations and regions. In table 4.6 we compare 
the proportion that report themselves to be very attached to the sub-state nation/region 
with those reporting themselves very attached to the state. To take the two poles from 
the CANS data, fully 80 per cent of the Scottish sample were very attached to Scotland 
as compared to the 43 per cent who were very attached to the UK. In Île de France, 
by contrast, only 26 per cent were very attached to ‘regional’ level as compared to the 
53 per cent who reported themselves to be very attached to France. 
When England is incorporated in the table we note that it is among those ‘regions’ in which 
attachment to region is greater than attachment to state. Perhaps even more interesting 
is that English attachment to both nation and state appears relatively weaker than that in 
most other territories. Indeed, it is striking that the proportion of English respondents who 
are very attached to the UK is substantially lower than the proportion of either Welsh or 
Scottish respondents who reported themselves to be very attached to the same UK state.
A: ‘Region’ (%) B: State (%) A – B
Scotland 80 43 37
Catalonia 55 25 30
Wales 69 49 20
Brittany 65 49 16
Thuringia 57 42 15
Galicia 58 44 14
England 44 31 13
Bavaria 53 42 11
Alsace 60 60 0
Vienna 52 61 -9
Salzburg 52 64 -12
Upper Austria 51 62 -11
Lower Saxony 36 51 -15
Castilla la Mancha 33 52 -19
Île de France 26 53 -27
Source: CANS 2009; FoE 2011
Table 4.5 
Degree of attachment in 
England to England/UK, 
2011 (%)
Table 4.6 
Very attached ‘region’ and 
state, comparative (%)
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One indication of the pride in and attachment to England across the English electorate 
is the very strong support shown in the FoE survey to the suggestion that St George’s 
Day should be celebrated as a bank holiday. As is clear from table 4.7, fully 74 per cent 
of our respondents agreed with this proposition, with 47 per cent ‘agreeing strongly’. 
While one response might be to dismiss such a finding on the basis that we should not 
be surprised that three-quarters of the electorate approve of the idea of an addition to 
their annual holiday allowance, we would caution against such a cynical or dismissive 
interpretation. We would rather view this finding as further confirmation of the broader 
pattern of responses that we have been highlighting in this discussion. Certainly scholars 
have long recognised the central role played by the symbolic and the ceremonial in (every) 
national identity. We should not be surprised, therefore, that an increased awareness of 
and pride in Englishness is being accompanied by such overwhelming levels of support for 
the public celebration of English national identity. 
Agree strongly 47
Tend to agree 27
Tend to disagree 8
Disagree strongly 4
Don’t know 13
N 1,507
Source: FoE 2011 
Question: Should St George’s Day be a public holiday?
Thus far in this section we have explored evidence that suggests that, while dual or 
nested, English and British national identities remain the majority position among the 
English electorate, it is nonetheless English identity that is in the ascendancy. It is 
English identity that is most strongly felt and that generates most pride; and it is England 
rather than the UK as a whole that generates the strongest sense of attachment. 
Moreover, with the caveat that, on some measures, Britishness retains a somewhat 
stronger grip in London, it appears that the pattern is broadly similar across England as 
a whole. But to what extent is English identity shared across various social cleavages 
within English society?
To answer that question, table 4.8 sets out the relationship between a range of social and 
economic variables and national identity as measured by the ‘Moreno’ question (see table 
4.1 and figure 4.3). 
As is immediately apparent, with one important exception (discussed below), English 
identity appears to be stronger than British identity – or the English component of dual 
English-British identity stronger than the British component – across all social and 
demographic groups. True, there are some noticeable differences. So, for instance, 
members of social class C2 appear to attach more importance to their English identity 
than those in the top or bottom social strata. Conservative voters place greater emphasis 
on their English identity than do Labour voters, with Liberal Democrat identifiers noticeably 
less likely to emphasise their English identity than supporters of either of the other main 
parties. But however fascinating these differences, what is surely more significant is the 
sheer consistency of the overall picture. English identity is stronger than British identity 
across almost all major social groups surveyed.10
The major exception is provided by ethnic minority respondents. Put simply, this group was 
far less likely to view themselves as English than the rest of the sample. Indeed while 43 per 
cent of ‘White British’ respondents chose either the ‘English not British’ or ‘More English 
than British’ options, this is true for only 27 per cent of their ethnic minority counterparts. 
Conversely, 37 per cent of ethnic minority respondents chose to prioritise their British over 
their English identity, while only 14 per cent of ‘White British’ respondents did so.
10 See More than One English Question by Michael Kenny and Guy Lodge (IPPR 2009) for a fuller discussion about 
the factors shaping English identity: http://www.ippr.org/publications/55/1695/more-than-one-english-question
Table 4.7 
Should St George’s Day 
be a public holiday? 
2011 (%)
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English > British Equal British > English E>B +/- B>E N
All 40 34 16 +24 1,507
White British 43 36 14 +29 1,380
Non-white British 19 23 37 -18 98
18–24 38 33 16 +22 182
25–39 37 38 21 +16 386
40–59 45 27 18 +27 487
60+ 41 47 7 +34 427
Male 42 32 17 +25 735
Female 39 36 15 +24 772
AB 36 36 19 +17 422
C1 43 35 15 +28 452
C2 46 33 14 +32 316
DE 33 32 19 +14 316
Labour 38 41 15 +23 479
Conservative 49 34 13 +36 460
Lib Dem 29 34 29 0 185
Source: FoE 2011 
Note: excludes ‘Don’t know’ responses.
Given that the numbers of ethnic minority respondents involved in our survey and answering 
these particular questions are small, it must be immediately acknowledged that some 
caution should be exercised in the interpretation of our results. A larger, more representative 
sample of ethnic minority respondents might produce a different result, and might also throw 
up significant differences between ethnic groups that we are unable to capture here. 
Moreover, even if the inference is correct that members of ethnic minorities living in 
England find Englishness a less amenable identity than Britishness, we would simply point 
out that there is nothing inevitable about this state of affairs. There is strong evidence 
from Scotland, for example, that the sub-state identity can prove more inclusive of ethnic 
minority immigrants and their descendents than the state-wide equivalent; the same is 
almost certainly true in Wales. One obvious difference between the Scottish and Welsh 
case and the experience in England is that the political class in England, with some minor 
exceptions, have made little effort to promote Englishness as an inclusive and tolerant 
identity. Instead, they continue to focus their energies espousing the merits of Britishness, 
ignoring the fact that it is English identity that has become emboldened in recent years. 
Even without such intervention, there are tentative signs that ethnic minorities are 
becoming less reluctant to embrace Englishness than in the past. For instance, as table 
4.9 demonstrates, when the BSA asked the ‘Moreno’ question in 2007, the number of 
‘non-whites’ choosing to prioritise their English over their British identity was just 4 per 
cent, compared with the 22 per cent recorded in 2011 by the FoE survey. Nonetheless, it 
appears that a significant ethnicity gap remains which in turn raises important questions in 
a context in which a more explicit English dimension is emerging in the country’s politics.
2007 2011
English not British 1 9
More English than British 3 13
Equally English and British 18 23
More British than English 16 11
British not English 38 26
Other/None/Don’t Know 24 20
N 84 98
Source: BSA 2007; FoE 2011
Table 4.8 
National identity 
(Moreno) by social 
group, 2011 (%)
Table 4.9 
National identity 
(Moreno) by non-white 
British, 2007–2011 (%)
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In this paper we have marshalled evidence that demonstrates that a number of potentially 
significant changes are underway in attitudes in England towards the government of the 
UK. English voters are now more sceptical of devolution than they have been in the past. 
In particular, there is a belief that the devolved polities benefit disproportionately from 
public spending and a related, very strong desire was evidenced for fiscal autonomy for 
Scotland. But the shift in attitudes is even more fundamental than that. Only one in four 
of the English electorate now supports the status quo in terms of the way England is 
governed. There is rather strong evidence of a desire for what we have termed an English 
dimension to the country’s politics; a desire that England be governed by specifically 
English arrangements, be that ‘English votes on English laws’ – that is, the modification of 
procedures in Westminster so that only English MPs are allowed to vote on legislation that 
affects England – or a full-blown English parliament. 
In addition to changing attitudes to constitutional arrangements, we have also shown 
evidence of substantial changes in patterns of national identity in England. In simple, perhaps 
simplistic terms, England is becoming more English. While dual identity – some combination 
of overlapping English and British identities – remains the norm, the English element is 
strengthening. With one potentially significant exception, this appears to be the case across 
the territory and across all social groups. All of which suggests that arguments to the effect 
that England is particularly divided or (without the skein of the UK) prone to centrifugal forces, 
are overplayed. England (qua England) appears as a relatively coherent political community.
Thus far, however, we have not probed the relationship between national identity and 
demands for constitutional and political change, either of the UK or, more particularly, 
England itself. We shall proceed to do so in this section. Throughout, we will employ both 
measures of national identity already utilised in this paper, namely responses to the ‘forced 
choice’ and the ‘Moreno’ questions.
As will become abundantly clear, a focus on the relationship between identity and political/
constitutional preferences reveals pronounced differences between the growing number 
of those in England who stress their Englishness, on the one hand, and the declining 
number of those who emphasise their Britishness, on the other. Those with an exclusive 
or stronger sense of their English identity tend, on average, to be more negative about 
devolution and more likely to believe that Scotland, in particular, benefits disproportionately 
from the union. They are also substantially more likely to support the development of an 
‘English dimension’ to the country’s politics, be that the modification of procedures at 
Westminster (‘English votes on English laws’) or, on other measures, an English parliament. 
In other words, there are signs that Englishness is becoming politicised. We argue that 
these findings matter because the group that choose to emphasise their English over their 
British identity – and who feel most strongly about the case for reform – are becoming an 
increasingly important constituency in English political life.
With regards to attitudes towards the impact of Scottish devolution on the way that the 
UK is governed, as table 5.1 makes clear, there is a clear difference across the English-
British ‘Moreno’ spectrum with those towards the English end more likely to take a 
negative view than those towards the British end: a finding confirmed when we review 
responses to the same question by the ‘forced choice’ identity categories (table 5.2). A 
particularly interesting – and potentially significant – aspect of table 5.1 is the way that 
attitudes among those who profess an exclusively English identity are so similar to those 
who view themselves as ‘More English than British’. This replicates findings from the 
Welsh and Scottish context which suggest that ‘nationalist’ attitudes are not confined 
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to only the exclusively Welsh or Scottish ends of the identity spectrum, but are also a 
characteristic of the more Welsh and Scottish end of the dual identity spectrum. This in 
turn hints at the potential political implications of the strengthening of English identity 
within what is still, overall, a context of nested identities.
English not 
British
More 
English 
than British
Equally 
English and 
British
More 
British than 
English
British not 
English
Improved 14 16 15 22 32
Made it worse 41 43 34 31 29
No difference 25 16 22 18 17
Don’t know 20 25 28 29 22
N 261 347 511 143 111 
Source: FoE 2011
British English
Improved 20 15
Made it worse 32 45
No difference 20 14
Don’t know 28 26
N 262 305
Source: FoE 2011 
Question: Creating the Scottish parliament has improved the way the UK is governed, made it worse, or made no difference?
Tables 5.3 and 5.4 report responses to a question that probes attitudes to relative levels 
of public spending in Scotland by national identity. Again, it is clear that there are obvious 
differences in responses along the identity spectrum. Even in a context in which a plurality 
across all identity categories hold that Scotland gets ‘more than its fair share’, strong 
English identifiers are more emphatic in that belief.
English not 
British
More 
English 
than British
Equally 
English and 
British
More 
British than 
English
British not 
English
Scotland gets fair share 19 16 24 25 24
Scotland gets more 
than fair share
52 57 39 43 38
Scotland gets less 
than fair share
3 3 3 6 3
Don’t know 25 24 34 27 36
N 261 347 511 143 111
Source: FoE 2011
British English
Scotland gets fair share 25 15
Scotland gets more than fair share 39 53
Scotland gets less than fair share 3 2
Don’t know 33 30
N 262 305
Source: FoE 2011 
Question: Would you say that, compared with other parts of the UK, Scotland gets pretty much its fair share of government 
spending, more than its fair share, or less than its fair share?
Table 5.1 
Scottish devolution 
‘improved’ way UK 
governed by national 
identity (Moreno), 
2011 (%)
Table 5.2 
Scottish devolution 
‘improved’ way UK 
governed by national 
identity (forced choice), 
2011 (%)
Table 5.3 
Scotland ‘fair share’ 
by national identity 
(Moreno), 2011 (%)
Table 5.4 
Scotland ‘fair share’ by 
national identity (forced 
choice), 2011 (%)
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It is also clear that the same dynamic is at play when we review responses to a statement 
that propounds the view that Scottish MPs should not be allowed to vote on laws that 
affect only England (tables 5.5 and 5.6). As we have already seen, this is a popular 
proposition in general. Even so, as table 5.5 in particular makes clear, differences in 
response across the identity spectrum are very striking with ‘English votes on English 
laws’ enjoying overwhelming support among strong English identifiers. A similar pattern 
emerges when it comes to support for full fiscal autonomy (or ‘devolution-max’) – see 
tables 5.7 and 5.8. 
English not 
British
More Eng. 
than Brit.
Equally 
Eng. & Brit.
More Brit. 
than Eng.
British not 
English
Agree strongly 71 65 47 41 44
Tend to agree 20 20 33 34 27
Tend to disagree 4 7 7 14 13
Disagree strongly 0 1 1 3 6
Don’t know 4 6 12 8 10
N 261 347 511 143 111
Source: FoE 2011
British English
Agree strongly 42 61
Tend to agree 35 24
Tend to disagree 11 7
Disagree strongly 3 1
Don’t know 9 8
N 262 305
Source: FoE 2011 
Question: Now that Scotland has its own parliament, Scottish MPs should no longer be allowed to vote in the House of 
Commons on laws that only affect England.
English not 
British
More Eng. 
than Brit.
Equally 
Eng. & Brit.
More Brit. 
than Eng.
British not 
English
Agree strongly 67 51 37 35 38
Tend to agree 25 36 42 42 35
Tend to disagree 3 7 8 9 9
Disagree strongly 0 1 1 3 5
Don’t know 5 6 12 10 13
N 261 347 511 143 111
Source: FoE 2011 
British English
Agree strongly 30 48
Tend to agree 46 36
Tend to disagree 9 9
Disagree strongly 3 1
Don’t know 11 7
N 262 305
Source: FoE 2011 
Question: Now that Scotland has its own parliament, it should pay for its services out of taxes collected in Scotland.
Table 5.5 
‘English votes on English 
laws’ by national identity 
(Moreno), 2011 (%)
Table 5.6 
‘English votes on English 
laws’ by national identity 
(forced choice), 2011 (%)
Table 5.7 
Fiscal autonomy 
by national identity 
(Moreno), 2011 (%)
Table 5.8 
Fiscal autonomy by 
national identity (forced 
choice), 2011 (%)
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The FoE survey included two questions designed to elicit views on desired constitutional 
arrangements for England (qua England). In a previous section we argued that responses 
to these questions strongly suggest that support for current governance arrangements 
is limited (at around one in four of the electorate) and that, rather, there is support for an 
‘English dimension’ to English politics. 
In tables 5.9 and 5.10 we report responses by national identity to a question that asked 
respondents to identify the level of government that they believe should have most 
influence over the way England is run, in the context of a country characterised by rather 
different political institutions. Five options were offered: stronger local government; 
elected regional assemblies; an English parliament; the UK government (that is a 
continuation of the status quo); and the EU. As is clear, in this context strong English 
identifiers are more than twice as likely to favour an English parliament as compared to 
strong British identifiers. Note also that support for the status quo is strongest among the 
smallest group: those that say they are exclusively British.
English not 
British
More Eng. 
than Brit.
Equally 
Eng. & Brit.
More Brit. 
than Eng.
British not 
English
Stronger local councils 14 12 20 22 22
Elected regional 
assemblies
13 12 11 17 12
English parliament 52 51 30 22 21
UK government 14 18 28 32 33
European Union 0 0 0 1 0
Other 1 1 1 1 2
Don’t know 5 7 11 6 10
N 261 347 511 143 111
Source: FoE 2011
British English
Stronger local councils 21 13
Elected regional assemblies 11 10
English parliament 24 47
UK government 35 22
European Union 0 0
Other 2 1
Don’t know 8 8
N 262 305
Source: FoE 2011 
Question: And what if, in the future, there were different types of institutions in England. Which of the following do you think 
should have the most influence over the way England is run?
Another question offered a different set of options for England, namely a continuation of 
the status quo, elected regional assemblies, an English parliament, and ‘English votes 
on English laws’ in Westminster. As table 5.11 makes particularly clear, responses differ 
markedly by identity profile, with strong English identifiers twice as likely to support 
one of the English options as compared to strong British identifiers. It seems clear that 
English national identity is closely associated with support for the institutionalisation of an 
English dimension to the country’s politics. Or in other words, English identity has political 
consequences.
Table 5.9 
Constitutional 
preferences by national 
identity (Moreno), 
2011 (%)
Table 5.10 
Constitutional 
preferences by national 
identity (forced choice), 
2011 (%)
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English not 
British
More 
English 
than British
Equally 
English and 
British
More 
British than 
English
British not 
English
Status quo 13 19 31 21 35
‘English votes on 
English laws’ 
39 44 34 21 20
Regional assemblies 7 5 12 28 8
English parliament 32 23 10 13 16
Don’t know 9 10 13 17 20
N 61 347 511 143 111
Source: FoE 2011
British English
Status quo 30 21
‘English votes on English laws’ 31 45
Regional assemblies 8 6
English parliament 14 18
Don’t know 17 9
N 262 305
Source: FoE 2011 
Question: With all the changes going on in the way different parts of the UK are run, which of the following do you think 
would be best for England? For England to be governed as it is now with laws made by all MPs in the UK parliament 
(status quo); with laws made by English MPs in the UK parliament; for each region of England to have its own assembly; for 
England as a whole to have its own new English parliament with law-making powers.
Table 5.11 
‘Best for England’ 
by national identity 
(Moreno), 2011 (%)
Table 5.12 
‘Best for England’ by 
national identity (forced 
choice), 2011 (%)
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Survey data of the kind reported in this paper are rarely cut and dried. Alternative readings 
are possible. Nonetheless, we believe that we have presented compelling evidence 
to suggest that the English electorate is dissatisfied – increasingly so – with current 
arrangements for the territorial government of the UK in general, and England in particular. 
Although we remain unconvinced that any particular institutional manifestation yet enjoys 
truly hegemonic status, we also believe that data presented here supports the claim that 
the English electorate desires what we have termed an English dimension to the country’s 
institutions of government. Or in other words, it wants to see England more clearly 
demarcated as a unit from the rest of the UK, not simply by default or omission but by 
conscious commission. The English electorate also wishes to see political representatives 
from England (whether they be elected to Westminster or some putative English 
parliament) rather than elected representatives from the UK as a whole, make decisions 
for England. Dissatisfaction with the status quo and support for this English dimension 
is particularly strong among those with a strong sense of English identity, a group that 
represents a growing proportion of the population.
It would seem, therefore, that after many years in which prophecies of an English 
awakening appeared more a case of wishful thinking (or scaremongering), a stirring is 
finally in evidence. After centuries of being subsumed within the wider state, England is 
re-emerging as a political community. This is not simply as an unintended consequence of 
devolution, but it is a development – even a political project (if that is not too portentous a 
phrase) – that enjoys significant levels of popular support in a country that appears to be 
increasingly conscious of a distinct national identity that is not simply reducible to Britain 
and Britishness. More significantly, perhaps, the strengthening and politicisation of English 
identity is taking place in the absence of any formal political mobilisation. Englishness, in 
other words, has a momentum of its own. 
This development clearly represents a serious challenge – or, more correctly, a series of 
challenges – both socially and politically. As we have already made clear, while English 
identity is shared geographically across the territory, encompassing even those areas 
with a strong sense of ‘regional identity’, and while it is also shared broadly across social 
groups, there remains one significant outlier: members of ethnic minorities currently tend to 
remain significantly more British and less English in terms of their sense of national identity. 
This is not, in our view, an insurmountable difficulty, and there is tentative evidence that 
attitudes within ethnic minority communities are beginning to consider English identity more 
favourably than in the past, but it is clearly a matter on which proponents of an English 
dimension need to reflect. And in fairness, a number are doing just that.11
Perhaps more intractable are the practical difficulties that would inevitably arise in the 
context of any genuine attempt to introduce an institutionalised English dimension to the 
country’s politics. ‘English votes on English laws’ may well resonate as a slogan, but as 
many have previously noted, there are formidable practical barriers to its introduction. And 
even were these barriers overcome, such an arrangement would remain vulnerable to the 
‘doomsday scenario’ of a UK general election resulting in one party enjoying a majority of 
seats in England but another party forming the government because of results elsewhere 
across the state. This is indeed what occurred in 1964 and October 1974. Any recurrence 
in the context of ‘English votes on English laws’ would be a recipe for constitutional 
chaos. That said, however, we would hazard that it is equally doubtful whether the current 
11 See for instance Mark Perryman (ed) Breaking up Britain: Four nations after a union and ‘English First, British 
Second’ by Gareth Young: http://toque.co.uk/english-first-british-second.
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arrangements could themselves survive the legitimacy crisis that would inevitably develop 
should we see a repeat of the 1964 and 1974 results. The argument that reform of this 
nature is too difficult is likely to evaporate in the face of English public opinion. 
Similarly, doubts have also been voiced about the difficulties associated with the 
establishment of an English parliament. In particular, is it realistic to expect such a body to 
remain in some sense subservient to a reformed and very much weakened UK state?
Yet despite such difficulties it appears increasing unlikely that the status quo will remain 
tenable for much longer. Events north of the border will of course have an impact on 
the English debate. Should the Scottish people vote for independence, then a new 
constitutional settlement for England and the other nations of the UK would urgently 
be needed. If Scotland is offered and then chooses ‘devolution-max’, the West Lothian 
question becomes even more egregious. Surely it is impossible to think of Scottish 
MPs being returned to Westminster on the same basis as their English counterparts if 
Scotland has something approaching full fiscal autonomy. But even if Scotland chooses 
to reject independence and ‘devolution-max’ and instead opts for the status quo, the 
Future of England survey suggests that the rise in English sentiment against the current 
arrangements will prove hard to resist. It would be folly to believe that an answer to the 
English question will simply arise as a by-product of developments in Scotland. However 
important the Scottish debate is, it must not be allowed to distract attention from a 
meaningful public conversation about the future of shape of English governance. 
Standing in the way of such a conversation is a British political class which has, on the 
whole, failed to engage seriously with the changing attitudes that we have traced in this 
paper. Their reluctance to address the new politics of Englishness perhaps explains why 
the English public have little faith that an English dimension will be forthcoming. One 
indication is the responses to a question (table 6.1) which asked respondents which level 
of government they expected to have most influence over decisions affecting standards of 
living in 10 years time. Despite the desire for an English dimension, only one in 10 expect 
that an English layer of government will have significant influence on this issue. 
Level of government
EU 29
UK 37
English 12
Regional 6
Don’t know 15
N 1507
Source: FoE 2011 
Question: In 10 years, do you think that the standards of living of people in England will depend most on decisions taken at 
the UK level, decisions taken at the English level, decisions taken at the regional level within England, or decisions taken at 
the European level?
Even more significant was the response to a question that asked respondents which 
political party in their view ‘best stands up for the interests of England’. As is made clear 
in table 6.2, a (narrow) plurality supported the view that no party does this.
To the extent that one agrees that ‘English interests’ require championing, it is hard to 
dissemble from the view that they are not sufficiently well represented in the current 
political system. Unlike Scotland and Wales, there is no significant political party 
promoting England as a locus and focus of political life. That the tiny English Democrats 
are currently absorbing members from a disintegrating British National Party makes clear 
that they will not plug that particular gap.12 UKIP’s recent conversion to the cause of an 
12 For example, two very prominent former BNP activists – Chris Beverley and Eddy Butler – are now members 
of the English Democrats, the latter following an unsuccessful leadership bid against the BNP’s Nick Griffin in 
2010. Despite their membership of the English Democrats, Beverley and Butler continue to work for BNP MEP, 
Andrew Brons. See http://andrewbrons.eu/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=71&Itemid=120 
(accessed 5 January 2012)
Table 6.1 
In 10 years, standards 
of living of people in 
England will depend 
most on decisions 
taken at which level of 
government? 2011 (%)
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English parliament suggests they hope to broaden their appeal in England, but they can 
draw little encouragement from table 6.2. 
Party
British National Party 4
Conservatives 20
English Democrats 2
Green Party 2
Labour 21
Liberal Democrats 4
UK Independence Party 9
‘I do not think that any party stands up for the interests of England’ 23
Don’t know 15
N 1507
Source: FoE 2011 
Question: Which party, if any, of the following parties do you think best stands up for the interests of England?
As for the mainstream political parties, Labour appears caught between the Scylla of the 
failure of its English regionalist project and the Charybdis of its dependency on its block 
of Scottish and Welsh MPs. The result is a party resolutely in denial about the ‘English 
question’. This denial has most recently taken the form of the championing of ‘city 
regions’ in England, a proposal that, however valid as a means of improving government 
within England, is irrelevant to the question of how the government of England as a whole 
relates to that of Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. Meanwhile, the Liberal Democrats, 
while ostensibly a federalist party and, therefore, seemingly well-placed to capitalise on 
support for change to the territorial status quo, are in fact still wedded to an English 
regionalist approach to UK federalism. They certainly show little appetite to engage 
seriously with England qua England.
As already mentioned, the Conservatives have long championed some version of ‘English 
votes on English laws’. Yet, there is cause to doubt the seriousness of that commitment, 
not least because the party is continuing to oppose changes in Scotland and Wales that 
might make ‘English votes on English laws’ a more viable proposition. Recall that the 
operation of the Barnett formula means that any funding commitment entered into for 
England has implications for the devolved territories. This in turn gives MPs from those 
territories a legitimate interest in voting on ‘English’ matters. So any serious attempt to 
operationalise ‘English votes on English laws’ would surely require the disentangling of 
financial arrangements of the devolved territories from those of England through some 
form of fiscal autonomy or radically revised funding arrangements. Yet the Conservatives 
remain adamantly opposed to such reform. In this case, the party’s longstanding 
opposition to the further devolution of power to Scotland and Wales apparently trumps its 
championing of English ‘rights’. 
The fate of the UK Coalition agreement pledge to establish a commission to consider the 
West Lothian question is another indication that this is an issue that all the mainstream 
political parties, including the Conservatives, find easier to ignore: there has been a 
palpable lack of urgency about redeeming the pledge. Moreover the commission’s 
membership and narrow terms of reference ensure that this will be a limited, largely 
technocratic exercise. It is certainly very hard to imagine how this could trigger the 
fundamental, tectonic changes to the government of the UK that would be required if the 
English dimension is to be taken seriously.
Ignoring the developments highlighted in this paper – growing popular dissatisfaction 
with the territorial status quo and support for an English dimension to the institutions of 
government – will not make them disappear. Especially given that they are buttressed, not 
only by the workings of a system of asymmetric devolution that ensures that a de facto 
Table 6.2 
Which political party 
best stands up for the 
interests of England? 
2011 (%)
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English polity is emerging ever more clearly into view, but also by changes in patterns 
of national identity. The latter are to be sure particularly consequential. Despite the 
exhortations of successive governments that have focused exclusively on Britishness, at 
the popular level it is Englishness that resonates most. These developments matter. In our 
view, the main problem is not that the English question is now finally being asked by the 
country’s electorate, but rather the failure of the British political class to take it, and them, 
seriously.
